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1Model Risk and Regulatory Capital
ABSTRACT
In this paper we propose a general framework for quantiﬁcation of model risk. This
framework allows one to allocate regulatory capital to positions in a given market
depending on the extent to which this market can be reliably modeled. Our approach
is based on computing worst-case risk measures over sets of models that are in some
appropriate sense close to a nominal model. The method is general in the sense that
it can be applied with any of the usual risk measures such as Value-at-Risk and Tail
Conditional Expectation. Inasfar as risk measures can also be used as pricing tools
or as determinants of margin requirements, the paper provides a quantiﬁcation of
model risk in these settings as well. We present applications both to stock portfolios
and to derivative products: we ﬁnd that, for usual speciﬁcations, misspeciﬁcation
risk is much more important than estimation risk.
JEL codes: G12, G18
Key words: Capital requirements, (Coherent) Risk management, Derivative pricing
models.
2I. Introduction
Due to the growing complexity of ﬁnancial markets, ﬁnancial institutions rely more and
more on the use of models to assess the risks to which they are exposed. The accuracy
of these risk assessments depends crucially on the extent to which a market can be
reliably modeled. Choosing an appropriate model to compute market risk measures is
an important and diﬃcult task. It is a widespread feeling among both academics and
practitioners that, although some models do a better job than others, the search for one
ultimate model is futile. An approach that takes the limitations of our knowledge into
account is to develop models—depending on the application—that capture the most
important aspects of a particular market, and to somehow control for the fact that the
assessment of risk is based on a possibly misspeciﬁed model (see Derman (1996)).
The hazard of working with a potentially misspeciﬁed model is called model risk.
Currently no explicit capital requirements are set by the regulators in connection with
model risk. This done indirectly using the so called multiplication factors. However,
the Basle Committee has indicated that it plans to expand the current capital adequacy
framework to improve the charting of risks to which ﬁnancial institutions are exposed
(see Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (1999)). In particular, the Committee
intends to set capital requirements for operational risk, which consists for an important
part of model risk. Just as the 1996 Amendment of the Basle Committee stimulated
ﬁnancial institutions to reﬁne their market risk models, banks are likely to make more
detailed assessments of model risk after incorporation of model risk regulation in the
Basle Accord. As part of their internal risk management systems, most large ﬁnancial
institutions already set aside reserves for model risk (the so-called model reserves). This
means that booking of certain proﬁts on trades is postponed if it is felt that these proﬁts
are sensitive to the used model.
The aim of this paper is to provide a quantitative basis for the incorporation of model
risk in regulatory capital requirements. The same framework may also be used for the
computation of model reserves in the context of internal risk management procedures
within ﬁnancial institutions; in addition, the method may be used in margin setting
3by clearing house exchanges, or as a pricing tool. To extend the current practice of
computing market risk measures on the basis of some given (“nominal”) model, we
determine a set of plausible alternative models. In recognition of the fact that each of
these models is a (reasonable) candidate for representing reality, we propose to compute
a worst-case market risk measure over our set of alternative models. Model risk is then
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between this measure and the market risk measure computed
from the nominal model. We distinguish between model risk due to estimation error
and model risk due to misspeciﬁcation.
Previous studies on model risk in interest rate markets have focused on the risk
of using incorrect parameter values in a parametric setting (see, for example, Gibson,
Lhabitant, Pistre, and Talay (1999), Talay and Ziyu (2000), Bossy, Gibson, Lhabitant,
Pistre, and Talay (2000), and Bossy, Gibson, Lhabitant, Pistre, Talay, and Ziyu (2000)).
However, our study suggests that the leading factor in model risk is often misspeciﬁcation
rather than parameter estimation error. Hull and Suo (2001) investigate the model risk
associated with the calculation of prices and deltas for illiquid exotic options based on
an implied-volatility model that is calibrated using current prices of liquid products.
Their paper clearly demonstrates the presence of model risk in a number of situations.
In this paper, we assess risk in derivative products on the basis of the total hedging error
rather than the error in computing Greeks, and we propose a quantitative measure of
model risk that could be used, for instance, in the determination of model reserves.
Steps towards the quantiﬁcation of model risk for derivative contracts have been taken
by Green and Figlewski (1999), who show that the risk of trading derivative securities
can be decreased substantially by delta hedging. We follow this line of thought below by
considering the risk of derivative products in combination with a given hedging strategy.
The proposed methodology encompasses the methodology proposed by Hull and Suo
(2001). Furthermore, robustness issues as treated by El Karoui, Jeanblanc-Picqu´ e, and
Shreve (1998) ﬁt into the proposed setup.
One major area where ﬁnancial models play an important role is the risk management
of the portfolios of ﬁnancial institutions. We discuss value-at-risk and tail conditional
4expectation for a simple model to illustrate our model risk measurement tools. The
results can be interpreted in terms of a multiplication factor that should be applied to
account for model risk in a given market. Our results for this simple model indicate
that a signiﬁcant part of the multiplication factor of three to four used by the Basle
Committee can be explained in this way when computing the 99% value-at-risk at a
95% conﬁdence level. We ﬁnd that the model risk due to misspeciﬁcation is much larger
than the model risk due to estimation error.
Another area which relies heavily on ﬁnancial models is constituted by derivatives
trading. As already mentioned, Green and Figlewski (1999) found that risks in derivative
contracts can be reduced considerably by delta hedging. To evaluate derivative pricing
models it is, therefore, important to take the hedging strategy into account as well, since
ﬁnancial institutions use the possibility of hedging extensively. A natural and intuitive
approach is to view the cost of hedging of a derivative using a particular hedging strategy,
instead of the ﬁnal payoﬀ as the risk of a derivative. Since most derivative pricing models
are continuous-time models while in practice it is only possible to hedge in discrete time,
derivative contracts cannot be hedged perfectly and so they are subject to market risk.
The assessment of this market risk is model-dependent, and we deﬁne model risk as
the diﬀerence between the worst-case market risk measure and the nominal market
risk measure. We illustrate our approach for the Black-Scholes family of option pricing
models. Our results indicate again that model risk due to misspeciﬁcation is much larger
than the model risk due to estimation error.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we give an
overview of market risk measurement. We discuss some of the popular risk measures
with some emphasis on coherent market risk measurement which ﬁts neatly with the
model risk measurement method proposed in Section III. In Section III we propose a
general framework for incorporation of model risk. This is based on a type of worst-case
analysis. A decomposition of model risk in a parametric and a nonparametric part is
proposed. Section IVprovides an application to portfolio risk management. We discuss
the value-at-risk and the tail conditional expectation approach. In Section Vwe apply
5our methodology to derivative securities. Finally, Section VI concludes.
II. Market Risk Measurement
By market risk we understand the risk caused by random ﬂuctuations in future asset
prices. For each given position, the most basic question that a risk manager must be
able to answer is whether or not the risk associated to this position is acceptable. This
qualitative decision is often based on the computation of a “risk measure” which in some
way represents the distance to (un)acceptability. Such a risk measure may, for instance,
be arrived at as follows. Since, in the context of ﬁnance, risk is usually measured in
terms of the distribution of only one variable (proﬁt/loss), an unacceptable position
can be made acceptable if enough of a suitable “sweetener” is added. The amount of
sweetener that has to be added to make a given position just acceptable is a natural
measure of the distance to acceptability.
A. Use of market risk measures
Market risk measures may be used for a number of diﬀerent purposes.
1. Regulatory capital requirements for securities ﬁrms and banks are computed on
the basis of risk measures. Speciﬁcally, the value-at-risk method has been adopted
by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (1996).
2. Some banks set reserves for trading desks as part of their internal risk management
procedures. The size of the reserve is coupled to some measure of the riskiness of
the positions taken by the desk.
3. Exchanges need to guarantee the promises to all parties involved in a contract.
To guarantee these promises they use clearing margins for their members. For
example, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and many other exchanges
use SPAN to determine the clearing margins. For more detailed information, see
Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999) and SPAN (1995).
64. Market risk measures may also be used as pricing tools, since they can be used to
compare diﬀerent risks so that good deals can be identiﬁed. This point of view
is elaborated for instance in Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) and Jaschke and
K¨ uchler (2001).
B. Notation and deﬁnitions
Since in this paper we are interested in model risk, we will be working with classes of
models rather than with a single model. It is not always convenient to use the same
probability space for each of these models. Therefore, we start by a formal description
of a setting that allows the use of multiple probability spaces.
Deﬁnition 1 A model is a probability space (Ω,F,P).
One could imagine more elaborate probabilistic settings; in particular, a ﬁltration might
be assumed given. However, the above notion will be suﬃcient for the purposes of this
paper. For any model m,l e tR(m) denote the space of equivalence classes of measurable
real-valued functions on (Ω,F).
Deﬁnition 2 Let a model m be given. A risk deﬁned on m is an element of R(m).
This deﬁnition, in which a “risk” is a random variable deﬁned on a given probability
space, follows the terminology of Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999) and Delbaen
(2000). We introduce a similar concept for model classes rather than for individual
models.
Deﬁnition 3 Let M be a class of models. A product deﬁned on M is a mapping that
assigns to each model m ∈Ma risk deﬁned on m. The set of all products deﬁned on
M is denoted by X(M).
The risk induced by a product Π on a model m will be denoted by Πm.S i n c eR(m)i s
a vector space, the set of products X(M) has the structure of a vector space as well.
For instance, if Π1 and Π2 are products deﬁned on the same class of models M,t h e n
7Π1 +Π 2 is the product that associates to a model m in M the risk (Π1)m +( Π 2)m.
Similarly, we can also deﬁne products relative to a reference product (if the reference
product is nonzero), and we have a partial ordering on products.
We now proceed to risk measures, again starting with the deﬁnition for an individual
model.
Deﬁnition 4 Let a model m be given. A risk measure deﬁned on m is a map from
R(m)t oI R∪{ ∞ } .1
Deﬁnition 5 Let a class of models M be given. A risk measurement method deﬁned
on M is a mapping that assigns to each model m ∈Ma risk measure deﬁned on m.
Risk measures can be used to separate “acceptable” from “unacceptable” risks in the
following way.
Deﬁnition 6 Let a model m be given, and let ρ be a risk measure deﬁned on m.T h e
acceptance set associated with ρ is the set
Aρ = {X ∈R (m) | ρ(X) ≤ 0}. (1)
So far we did not discuss speciﬁc properties for risk measures and related notions that
would justify the nomenclature. We come to this in the next section.
C. Popular risk measurement methods and their properties
Most risk measures used in practice can be viewed as risk measurement methods in the
formal sense of the previous section. Due to its prominent role in the amendment of
1996 by the Basle Committee, the value-at-risk approach is currently the most popular
method used in risk measurement (see, for example, Duﬃe and Pan (1997), Basle Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision (1996), Dowd (1998), and RISK Magazine (1996)). A
formal description of VaR may be given as follows.
1Including ∞ allows risks to be deﬁned on more general probability spaces, see Delbaen (2000).
8Deﬁnition 7 (Value at Risk (VaR)) Let a model class M be given. The value-at-
risk method with reference asset N ∈X (M)a n dlevel p ∈ (0,1) assigns to a model
m =( Ω ,F,P) ∈Mthe risk measure VaRm given by
VaRm : R(m)   X  → −inf {q ∈ IR : P(X/Nm ≤ q) ≥ p}∈IR ∪{ ∞ } . (2)
We now list a number of properties that risk measures and risk measurement methods
may satisfy. Again, we start with individual models. So, let a model m be given, and
let ρ be a risk measure deﬁned on m.S i n c em will be ﬁxed for the moment, we write
R(m)s i m p l ya sR. Some properties of interest will be stated as axioms. In the ﬁrst
axiom we also assume that a reference risk N ∈Rhas been given.
Axiom1 (Translation invariance) For all X ∈Rand τ ∈ IR, we h ave ρ(X + τN)=
ρ(X) − τ.
Adding (subtracting) an initial investment of size τ in the reference asset N decreases
(increases) the risk measure ρ by τ. Therefore, τ can be interpreted as the amount of
the sweetener for the risk X to become more acceptable (or less, in case τ is negative).
Axiom2 (Monotonicity) For all X and Y ∈Rwith X ≤ Y ,w eh a v eρ(X) ≥ ρ(Y ).
It seems natural to assign a higher value to risks that always have a lower payoﬀ. Note
that the axiom of monotonicity rules out the commonly used mean-variance measure
ρ(X)=−IE P(X)+γVarP (X), where γ is a risk aversion parameter. The VaR measure,
on the other hand, is monotonic.
Axiom3 (Positive homogeneity) For all X ∈Rand λ ≥ 0, ρ(λX)=λρ(X).
Again, this axiom is satisﬁed by VaR. The homogeneity axiom may be considered rea-
sonable as a local approximation, or when size eﬀects (due, for instance, to liquidity risk
or to regulatory constraints) are taken into account in the future net worth of a position.
Axiom4 (Subadditivity) For all X and Y ∈R ,w eh a v eρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X)+ρ(Y ).
9If the risk measure ρ satisﬁes the subadditivity property, the risk manager/supervisor
is sure that the sum of two separate risks X and Y can be estimated conservatively by
the sum of the risk measures of the separate risks. If a risk measure does not satisfy the
subadditivity property, a risk might be disguised by splitting it up. The VaR measure
does not satisfy the subadditivity property (see Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath
(1999) for a counterexample).
The above axioms can be transferred to risk measurement methods in a straight-
forward way. We shall say that a risk measurement method RMM deﬁned on a model
class M satisﬁes Axiom i (i =1 ,...,4) if for each m ∈Mthe risk measure RMMm on
m satisﬁes Axiom i with R = R(m). In the case of the translation invariance axiom, it
is assumed that a reference product in X(M)i sg i v e n .
The fact that VaR does not satisfy the subadditivity property is often seen as a
disadvantage of this risk measurement method; see Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath
(1999) for a more extensive discussion. Alternative risk measures have been proposed
that do satisfy the desirable subadditivity property. Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath
(1997) introduced the notion of coherent risk measures. Their ideas were formalized in
Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999), Artzner (1999), and Delbaen (2000).
Deﬁnition 8 A coherent risk measure is a risk measure that satisﬁes the axioms of
translation invariance, subadditivity, positive homogeneity, and monotonicity.
The deﬁnition can immediately be extended to produce the notion of a coherent risk
measurement method.
The four axioms still allow many measurement methods, so even when one decides to
use a coherent measure one needs further considerations to arrive at a speciﬁc method.
An example of a coherent risk measurement method is the worst conditional expectation
(WCE). Contrary to VaR, this measure takes the size of losses under the VaR limit into
account. Therefore, it is not possible to increase the expected return of a portfolio under
WCE restrictions by taking extremely risky bets with a very low probability but a very
high loss.
10Deﬁnition 9 (Worst Conditional Expectation (WCE)) Let a model class M be given.
The worst conditional expectation method with reference product N ∈X(M)a n dlevel
p ∈ (0,1) assigns to a model m =( Ω ,F,P) ∈Mthe risk measure WCEm given by
WCEm : R(m)   X  → −infA∈F, P(A)>p IE P [X/Nm | A] ∈ IR ∪{ ∞ } . (3)
It is a straightforward exercise to show that WCE satisﬁes the axioms of translation
invariance, monotonicity, positive homogeneity, and subadditivity. Though WCE has
nice theoretical implications, it is diﬃcult to compute in practice. However, it can be
shown that WCE equals the tail conditional expectation (TCE) in all practically relevant
cases (see proposition 5.3 of Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999)). TCE is deﬁned
as follows.
Deﬁnition 10 (Tail Conditional Expectation (TCE)) Let a model class M be given.
The tail conditional expectation method with reference product N ∈X (M)a n dlevel
p ∈ (0,1) assigns to a model m =( Ω ,F,P) ∈Mthe risk measure TCEm given by
TCEm : R(m)   X  → −IE P [X/Nm | X/Nm ≤− VaRm(X)] ∈ IR ∪{ ∞ } (4)
where VaR is taken with reference product R and at level p.
III. Model risk
Market risk measures are typically based on a class of scenarios together with a base
probability measure; both items are provided by a model m. At a higher level, however,
there is uncertainty about which model to use. A ﬁnancial institution’s perception of
market risk can deviate substantially from the true market risk due to the fact that
the actual dynamics are insuﬃciently represented by the model dynamics. Due to the
use of an incorrect model, the ﬁnancial institution may accept risks that it would ﬁnd
unacceptable in case it would know the actual dynamics. The risk associated to the
mismatch between model dynamics and actual dynamics is called model risk.
11We now want to ﬁnd a quantitative measure for model risk. Since the true dynamics
are unknown, it makes sense to form a set of alternative dynamics K (containing a
nominal model m) which is likely to contain the true dynamics. A natural candidate for
a model risk measure is the diﬀerence between the worst-case risk measure among all
models in the neighborhood K and the risk measure under the dynamics of the nominal
model m. If the market risk measurement method is translation invariant, the diﬀerence
between these two quantities gives the extra position in the reference product which has
to be added to the market risk measure of the nominal model to make the risk acceptable
even under the worst case dynamics. In the next section, this intuition is formalized.
A. Measuring model risk
Suppose that the ﬁnancial institution uses a risk measurement method RMM to assess
the acceptability of a product (portfolio) Π. In model m, the risk of the product Π
is computed as RMMm(Πm). To take into account model uncertainty, we take a set
of alternative dynamics K around m and compute the worst-case market risk measure
(with respect to K), which is given by supk∈K RMMk(Πk). Model risk may now be
quantiﬁed as follows.
Deﬁnition 11 (Model risk measure)2 Let M be a class of models, let m be a model in
M,a n dl e tK be a subset of M containing m. Furthermore, let Π be a product deﬁned
on M and let RMM be a risk measurement method for M.T h emodel risk associated to
the method RMM of product Π, with respect to the nominal model m and the tolerance
set K,i sg i v e nb y
φRMM(Π,m,K)=s u p k∈K RMMk(Πk) − RMMm(Πm). (5)
Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999) and Delbaen (2000) use one particular
model m to compute the market risk measure RMMm(Πm). With the deﬁnition above
we extend their risk measurement framework by including model risk. The amount
2The case where RMMm(Πm)=∞ is uninteresting since the ﬁnancial institution will never accept
the product Π in its portfolio.
12φRMM(Π,m,K) can be thought of as a model reserve that should be held to cover the
worst-case dynamics of K. Consider, for example, value-at-risk. From empirical data we
can determine whether the VaR limit given by a nominal model is exceeded as often as
predicted or more often. If the model is accurate in predicting the VaR limit we would
like to set a small model reserve. On the other hand, we want to set a large model
reserve in case the model does a poor job predicting the VaR limit. Adding the model
reserve φRMM(Π,m,K) to the nominal market risk measure RMMm(Πm) gives a total
risk measure equal to supk∈K RMMk(Πk). In appendix B we illustrate the procedure
for coherent risk measures, in particular, the WCE and SPAN. The size of the model
reserve (and thereby the total risk measure) is controlled by the size of K. In the next
section, we discuss the determination of K and the dependence of the model reserve on
model accuracy in more detail.
The model risk measure that we have deﬁned may have some desirable properties
depending on the market risk measurement method from which it has been derived.
Theorem1 (Invariance) Let RMM be a risk measurement method that is translation
invariant with respect to a reference product N. Then the model risk measure associated
to RMM is translation invariant in the sense that
φRMM(Π + τN,m,K)=φRMM(Π,m,K)( 6 )
for all τ ∈ IR.
Proof. Take τ ∈ IR. We h ave
φRMM(Π + τN,m,K)=s u p k∈K RMMk (Πk + τNk) − RMMm (Πm + τNm)
=s u p k∈K RMMk (Πk) − τ − RMMm (Πm)+τ
= φRMM(Π,m,K).
13The addition of a constant payoﬀ should not alter the model risk, since it is model
independent. Another way to look at it is that the constant payoﬀ can be fully hedged
by a position in the reference product.
Theorem2 (Positive homogeneity) Let RMM be a positively homogeneous risk mea-
surement method. Then the model risk measure associated to RMM is positively ho-
mogeneous as well, i.e.,
φRMM(λΠ,m,K)=λφRMM(Π,m,K)( 7 )
for all λ ≥ 0.
Proof. Take λ ≥ 0. We have
φRMM(λΠ,m,K)=s u p k∈K RMMk (λΠk) − RMMm (λΠm)
= λ(supk∈K RMMk (Πk) − RMMm (Πm))
= λφRMM(Π,m,K).
If market risk is measured proportionally to position size, then the same property holds
for model risk. This seems a reasonable characteristic.
Our model risk measure does not, in general, satisfy the subadditivity property.
However, if the basic market risk measurement method is subadditive, this property
does hold for what might be called total market risk, viz. the sum of nominal market
risk and model risk. This is immediately seen from the fact that total market risk is
given by the formula supk∈K RMMk(Πk), and from the general fact that supi(ai +bi) ≤
supi(ai)+s u p i(bi). As noted above, the reason why market risk measures are often
required to be subadditive is to prevent companies, trading desks, etc. from covering
up large risks by splitting them into separate positions that do satisfy the risk criteria.
If total market risk is reported, then subadditivity of this risk measure is suﬃcient for
this.
14We choose a worst-case approach to quantify model risk. An alternative would
be a Bayesian approach, in which the model risk measure is a weighted average of
risk measures according to some prior. Depending on its risk attitude, the ﬁnancial
institution can give more weight to unfavorable dynamics. However, the choice of a
prior is diﬃcult and arbitrary. In a worst-case approach, one only needs to specify the
tolerance set K; this may be seen as an acknowledgment of the restrictions of statistical
modeling in the face of limited data and limited understanding of the true dynamics.
B. Decomposition of Model Risk
The exposition given in the previous section was rather general. We did not specify
am o d e lm or a set of alternative models K. In this section we discuss some possible
choices for the set of alternative dynamics K. In practice, one starts with a (usually
parametric) model class, say M(Θ) ≡{ (Ω,F,Pθ):θ ∈ Θ}⊂M . Using an estimation
or calibration procedure, a particular element m(ˆ θ)i sc h o s e nf r o mM(Θ). Even if
the actual dynamics, say m0, belong to the parametric model class M(Θ), that is
m0 = m(θ0)f o rs o m eθ0 ∈ Θ, the ﬁnancial institution faces the risk of selecting the
wrong element m(ˆ θ). This risk is called model risk due to estimation error. To deﬁne
a neighborhood of plausible values around m(ˆ θ), one typically uses conﬁdence regions.
Speciﬁcally, we can place a conﬁdence region around the estimator ˆ θ for θ0 to deﬁne
some neighborhood around m(ˆ θ). Depending on a chosen level α we take a (1 − α)%




m(θ) ∈M(Θ) : θ ∈ CI1−α(ˆ θ)
 
(8)
In situations where one is interested in a speciﬁc market risk measurement method RMM
and a speciﬁc product Π, an alternative approach which focuses more directly on the
given situation is to use the set K deﬁned by
K(α)=
 









   
. (9)
3CI1−α(ˆ θ) denotes the (1 − α)%-conﬁdence interval for θ0.
15We deﬁne model risk due to estimation error,o rs i m p l yestimation risk, as the model
risk that is obtained from a tolerance set derived from conﬁdence regions in within the
model class.
Now let us consider the situation where the actual dynamics may not belong to
M(Θ). The risks that we are considering are real-valued random variables and so a
natural idea is to work on the basis of the associated distribution functions. Suppose
that a cumulative distribution function ˆ F(x) has been obtained by some nonparametric
estimation method. This allows us to deﬁne a tolerance set K depending on conﬁdence
level α in the following way:











where kα/2 is the critical value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic.4 As above, one
may also deﬁne tolerance sets that are more speciﬁcally tied to a given risk measurement
method and a given product. Along this line, one may estimate RMMm (Πm)ﬁ r s ta n d
deﬁne a tolerance set based on a conﬁdence region CI1−α for the estimate
K(α)={m :R M M m (Πm) ∈ CI1−α}.
In general, we can determine tolerance sets that are restricted or are not restricted to
a model class (unrestricted, in the sequel). As above, one may deﬁne model risk due to
estimation error as the model risk restricted to the model class M(Θ). The amount that
has to be added to arrive at the model risk determined from the unrestricted method
may be termed model risk due to misspeciﬁcation or simply misspeciﬁcation risk.I n
other words, if Kr is the restricted tolerance set and Ku is the unrestricted one, then we
deﬁne the misspeciﬁcation risk for a given product Π as
φRMM (Π,Kr, Ku)=s u p k∈Ku RMMk (Πk) − supk∈Kr RMMk (Πk). (10)
4Alternatively, uniform conﬁdence bounds around a non-parametric distribution may be obtained
from the Cram´ er-von Mises statistic or the Kuiper statistic (see, for example, Shorack and Wellner
(1986)).
16However, the quantity deﬁned above may in some cases be less than zero, whereas we
would prefer to deﬁne misspeciﬁcation risk in such a way that it is always nonnegative.
To achieve this with the above deﬁnition, we have to make sure that the set Kr is nested
in Ku. One way to ensure nesting is to form convex combinations. Note that, in a
context in which we are concerned with a speciﬁc product, it is reasonable to identify
models with the cumulative distribution functions induced by the given product, and in
this way it is indeed possible to consider convex combinations of models. The nesting
property can then be guaranteed by replacing the set Ku by the convex hull of Kr and the
original Ku. An alternative approach, which is perhaps more transparent, uses a family
{Ku(α)} of tolerance sets parameterized by conﬁdence level α. For a given conﬁdence
level α and a given tolerance set Kr, which may have been selected on the basis of the
same conﬁdence level, we then take Ku = Ku(β)w h e r eβ is deﬁned by
β =m i n ( α,sup{γ ∈ (0,1) : Kr ∈K u (γ)}). (11)
We will use the latter construction in the rest of the paper.
The analogs of Theorem1 (invariance) and Theorem2 (positive homogeneity) can
easily be shown to hold for both estimation risk and misspeciﬁcation risk separately.
Proofs follow the lines of the proofs of the cited results.
IV. Application to portfolio risk management
One of the most important tasks of a risk management department is to compute the
risk of the portfolio of the ﬁnancial institution. The Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) has suggested to set risk-based capital requirements which are closely related to
the value-at-risk methodology. Here we show how our model risk measurement approach
can be taken into account for a (simple) value-at-risk methodology.
Example 1 Value-at-Risk.






of the portfolio under consideration
for a period of length nT years (nT = 20, T =1 /252 (one day)). An elementary VaR












for j =1 ,..,n where µ and σ2 denote annualized mean and variance,
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θ =( µ,σ ). The model class M with typical element
m(θ): =
 





is the class of the lognormal distributions.
Let X0 ∈ I R denote the (model independent) initial capital, and let Π ∈X (M)
denote the portfolio at time T. Formulas for various versions of value-at-risk are pre-
sented below; see the Appendix for derivations. To compute worst cases, we follow the
approach of focusing directly on the given risk measurement method (VaR in this case)
and the given product, as discussed in subsection B above.
First, assume that asset returns are normal and let ˆ θ be an estimate of the parameter
θ =( µ,σ ). We shall call m(ˆ θ)t h enominal parametric model. The corresponding value-












where zp denotes the pth quantile of the (standard) normal distribution. Still assuming
normality of asset returns, the parametric worst-case value-at-risk is the lower bound of




. This lower bound is given









ΣVaR = T VaRm(ˆ θ)
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Nonparametric versions of VaR may be computed on the basis of the empirical distri-
bution function Fn.W e d e n o t e b y mn the model (IR,B(IR),Pn)w h e r ePn is given by













and  a  is the largest integer
that is less than or equal to a. Finally, the worst-case empirical VaR is the lower bound of
the (nonparametric) conﬁdence interval around VaRmn (Πmn), which may be computed
as







where β is as deﬁned in (11) and where f (x) can be estimated using, for instance, the
Rosenblatt-Parzen kernel estimator.5
Example 2 Tail Conditional Expectation.
Below we use tail conditional expectation as well as value-at-risk, so we repeat the
exercise of the previous example for TCE; again, see the Appendix for derivations.
Assume the same setting as before. The nominal parametric TCE (at level p) under




























5In our applications below we have approximately normal data and so we do bandwidth selection by
taking h =1 .06σn



































The empirical TCE can be computed by
TCEmn (Πmn)=−
1














The empirical worst-case TCE can be computed as


















Figure 1 shows the normal density with variance equal to the sample variances (say,
s2) of the S&P 500 data and the British pound / US dollar (£/$) exchange rate data and
compares this with a nonparametric density6 estimate of the densities of the S&P 500
and the £/$ exchange rate. We see that the returns from the S&P 500 and an investment
in British money market account exhibit more kurtosis than would be expected on the
basis of normally distributed returns. This aﬀects the value-at-risk and tail condition
expectation computations as can be seen in Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5. Here we plot the
99% (p =0 .01) one-day value-at-risk and 95% (p =0 .05) tail conditional expectation
for the S&P 500 and an investment in the British money market account. We choose
the 99% level for VaR, since this is the quantile required by BIS (see Basle Committee
6In view of the approximate normality of the data, the bandwidth h has been set equal to h =
1.06sn
−1/5 which is the optimal bandwidth selection for normally distributed data.
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GB Pound / US Dollar x normal





GB Pound / US dollar N(s=0.00639)
Figure 1. QQ-plot and density comparison of the normal density with nonparametric
density estimate (using a the Rosenblatt-Parzen kernel estimator with Gaussian kernel
and bandwidth h =1 .06sn−1/5) of the daily (total) returns of the S&P 500 and British
pound / US dollar exchange rate. Data period 26-10-’81 – 26-10-’01 for the S&P 500
and 03-01-’86 – 26-10-’01 for the £ / $ exchange rate.
21on Banking Supervision (1996)). For TCE we adopt a lower level, namely, the 95%
level. The choice of level is a trade-oﬀ between having enough data points available
for reliable estimation and putting enough weight on the extreme values. Since TCE
automatically assigns more weight to extreme outcomes, the 5% level still provides a
good representation of potential large losses while it increases the number of data points
by about a factor of 5 compared to the 1% level. The volatility estimate is based on the
past two years (500 days / data points) and is computed in the usual way. (For more
advanced volatility estimation methods see, for example, Eberlein, Kallsen, and Kristen
(2001).)
The relation between the worst-case risk measure and the risk measure based on
the nominal model may be analyzed in terms of a multiplication factor. We deﬁne the
multiplication factor for VaR or TCE as the ratio between the empirical worst-case VaR
(TCE) based on a 95% conﬁdence interval and the nominal parametric VaR (TCE).
Plots of the multiplication factor in various cases are shown in the ﬁgures. We see that
in case of 99% VaR multiplication factors of 2 for the S&P 500 and 1.6 for the £/$
exchange rate comfortably cover model risk at the 95% conﬁdence level during the full
sample period. In case of the 95% TCE we ﬁnd that multiplication factors of 1.7 for the
S&P 500 and 1.5 for the £/$ exchange rate are suﬃcient. For both the VaR and TCE
a multiplication factor of three would correspond to a conﬁdence level of 99.99%.
Ideally, the frequency of excessive losses (FOEL), that is the number of days at which
the loss exceeds the predicted VaR, should be close to the VaR levels. In Tables I and
II we present the results of a one-sided FOEL test at a level of 5. We denote by n the
number of days in the backtesting period, by f the number of times the VaR level has
been exceeded, and by 1−p the predicted level of VaR (97.5% or 99% in our case). The



















Figure 2. 99% VaR: The upper panel displays value-at-risk for the S&P 500 during
the period 26-10-’81 – 26-10-’01. Shown are the nominal parametric VaR, the worst-case
parametric VaR, the empirical VaR, and the empirical worst-case VaR. The lower panel
shows the multiplication factor deﬁned as the ratio between the empirical worst-case
VaR (based on a 95% conﬁdence interval) and the nominal parametric VaR.
Table I
FOEL test for nominal parametric VaR, worst-case parametric VaR,
nominal empirical VaR and worst-case empirical VaR (for deﬁnitions, see








nom. par. 97.5% 3.2% (2.8%;−) 2.7 0.00 yes
par. wc 97.5% 2.6% (2.2%;−) 0.5 0.32 no
nom. emp. 97.5% 3.0% (2.6%;−) 2.0 0.02 yes
emp. wc 97.5% 2.1% (1.7%;−) −1.9 0.97 no
nom. par. 99% 2.1% (1.7%;−) 5.2 0.00 yes
par. wc 99% 1.7% (1.4%;−) 3.8 0.00 yes
nom. emp. 99% 1.6% (1.2%;−) 3.1 0.00 yes














Figure 3. 99% VaR: The upper panel displays the value-at-risk for the British pound /
US dollar exchange rate during the period 03-01-’86 – 26-10-’01. Shown are the nominal
parametric VaR, the worst-case parametric VaR, the empirical VaR, and the empirical
worst-case VaR. The lower panel shows the multiplication factor deﬁned as the ratio
between the empirical worst-case VaR (based on a 95% conﬁdence interval) and the
nominal parametric VaR.
Table II
FOEL test for nominal parametric VaR, worst-case parametric VaR,
nominal empirical VaR and worst-case empirical VaR (for deﬁnitions, see








nom. par. 97.5% 3.3% (2.6%;−) 2.6 0.00 yes
par. wc 97.5% 2.8% (1.9%;−) 0.0 0.49 no
nom. emp. 97.5% 2.6% (2.0%;−) 0.3 0.40 no
emp. wc 97.5% 1.6% (0.9%;−) −6.2 1.00 no
nom. par. 99% 1.9% (1.4%;−) 4.0 0.00 yes
par. wc 99% 1.4% (0.8%;−) 1.4 0.07 no
nom. emp. 99% 1.2% (0.7%;−) 0.9 0.19 no
emp. wc 99% 0.6% (0.2%;−) −4.6 1.00 no














Figure 4. 95% TCE: The upper panel displays the tail conditional expectation for the
S&P 500 during the period 26-10-’81 – 26-10-’01. Shown are the nominal parametric
TCE, the worst-case parametric TCE, the empirical TCE, and the empirical worst-
case TCE. The lower panel shows the multiplication factor deﬁned as the ratio between















Figure 5. 95% TCE: The upper panel displays the tail conditional expectation for
the British pound / US dollar exchange rate during the period 03-01-’86 – 26-10-’01.
Shown are the nominal parametric TCE, the worst-case parametric TCE, the empirical
TCE, and the empirical worst-case TCE. The lower panel shows the multiplication factor
deﬁned as the ratio between the empirical worst-case TCE (based on a 95% conﬁdence
interval) and the nominal parametric TCE.
26The results indicate that the VaR model based on independent normally distributed
returns is strongly rejected both in case of the S&P 500 data and in case of the £/$
data. For both the S&P 500 and the £/$ exchange rate, taking estimation risk into
account seems suﬃcient in case of the 97.5% level since we cannot reject the worst-case
normal models for this quantile. In case of the 99% level, however, taking estimation
risk into account does not prevent the VaR limit from being exceeded too often. If we
take misspeciﬁcation risk into account by looking at the empirical worst-case model, the
number of times the VaR limit is crossed does not exceed the level predicted by the
model in a statistically signiﬁcant way.
V. Application to derivative securities
In this section we want to determine a model reserve for the models that derivative
traders use. We extend the analysis of Green and Figlewski (1999) by explicitly basing
our model reserve on a risk measure. Before we can determine this model reserve, we
should ﬁrst deﬁne the risk associated with a derivative security. Theoretically, derivative
assets can be exactly replicated (in case of a complete market) by a (dynamic) position
in the underlying asset and some numeraire asset. In practice, these replicating strate-
gies are not feasible due to transaction costs and the inability to trade continuously.
Therefore, ﬁnancial institutions rely on hedge strategies in discrete time. By hedging in
discrete time, however, the position consisting of the derivative and the hedging port-
folio is no longer risk free and subjected to market risk. We use this market risk to get
to a deﬁnition of the risk associated with a derivative. The model reserve can then be
based on the misspeciﬁcation of the market risk associated with the hedged derivative.
A. Derivative risks
For a portfolio of basis assets the value of the portfolio at the relevant time point is
a natural deﬁnition of the market risk of that portfolio. In principle, the same can
be done for derivatives. However, this would ignore the fact that ﬁnancial institutions
have the possibility (and make heavily use of this possibility) to hedge their derivative
27portfolio. Indeed, Green and Figlewski (1999) found that derivative risks can be reduced
considerably by delta hedging. Therefore, it is wise to take the hedge strategy of the
ﬁnancial institution into account when calculating the market risk of a derivative. We
suggest to deﬁne the market risk of a derivative as the market risk of the cost of hedging
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where S denotes the underlying asset(s), N denotes a numeraire asset, δ denotes the













For a formal deﬁnition we should introduce a ﬁltration such that the underlying
process and the trading strategy are well deﬁned w.r.t. this ﬁltration. However, since
we are only interested in (discounted) ﬁnal payoﬀs of the derivative we do not need to
extend the framework in Section II.B. Using a trading strategy γ we can introduce a
new risk Y = C (X;γ) deﬁned on m. If we would also be interested in payoﬀs during
the life of the option, we would need to extend the framework in Section II.B by using
processes instead of random variables.
In principle, the trading strategy γ used does not have to be related to the pricing
model. However, for ease of exposition we restrict our attention to the delta hedge which
is the most commonly used hedge technique in practice. Of course, a basis asset can
also be seen as a contingent claim.
B. Estimation risk and misspeciﬁcation risk
In most ﬁnancial institutions a trading desk (or its research department) should provide
risk management with a pricing model and a hedge (trading) strategy for the derivative
they would like to trade. The task of risk management is then to estimate the market risk
associated with this pricing model and hedge strategy. Consider the following example.
7The symbol   denotes the Hadamard product, that is, x   y =( x1y1,...,xnyn) (see, for example,
Magnus and Neudecker (1999)).
28The trading desk would like to trade plain vanilla (call, put) options on equity and
exchange rates. To do so they suggest to price the options using the Black-Scholes model
with implicit volatilities (which basically means taking the market prices as given). The
hedge strategy suggested is a daily delta hedge where the delta is computed using the
BS model with this implicit volatility.
To get an estimate of the market risk of the derivative using deﬁnition (22) the
ﬁnancial institution needs to get an estimate of the risk proﬁle (cdf) of the cost of
hedging. If the model suggested is correct this estimate can be obtained by a Monte
Carlo simulation of the dynamics of the underlying and computing the cost of hedging
using the pricing and hedge formulas. By increasing the number of simulations the
desired accuracy level can be reached. However, this would lead to the market risk of
the derivative in a BS model. To take possible model misspeciﬁcation into account we
need to see how the model performs on empirical data.
Since we obviously cannot perform a Monte Carlo simulation from the actual dy-
namics we rely on historical simulation, following, among others, Galai (1977), Merton,
Scholes, and Gladstein (1978), Merton, Scholes, and Gladstein (1982), and Green and
Figlewski (1999). To perform the historical simulation we have available a data set of
the underlying {s0,...,sn} and from these we get the (daily) logreturns {h1,...,hn}.T o
compute the implicit volatilities, we should have data on the option prices. The data
should cover a large range of diﬀerent moneyness levels, since over time the options
written move in and out of the money. Since we do not have data on option prices
available we approximate the option prices by computing them using the BS formula
with a one year historical volatility estimator which is also used to compute the hedge
ratios (BS deltas).8 This approach has the advantage that we can write a new option
every day. We start by writing an option f at time t = 0 and continue this until
t = n − k where k = T ∗ no,a n dT denotes the maturity of the option in years and no
is the number of days in a year. In addition to the option prices {f (0),...,f (n − k)}
8Though implicit volatility is by deﬁnition superior to historical volatility for pricing purposes, its
superiority for hedging purposes is unclear. In a review article Figlewski (1997) shows that typically
implicit volatilities contain only marginally more information about future volatility than historical
volatility estimators.
29we compute the actual cost of hedging the option using the speciﬁed hedge strategy to
get {C (0),...,C (n − k)} (see eq. (22)). Using this data we compute an estimator for
the cdf of the (discounted) ﬁnal proﬁt and loss (P&L) account P&L ≡ f − C.T h e
cdf (or pdf) of P&L can be seen as the return distribution of pricing derivatives with
the speciﬁed pricing model (in our case the BS model with historical volatility) and the
speciﬁed hedge strategy (daily hedge based on BS deltas using historical volatility). On
this distribution we can then compute the relevant risk measures described in Section
II.C.
In doing so we need to take into account the fact that the data is subject to the over-
lapping samples problem. We handle this problem by using the method of Newey and
West (1987). We can compare the computed empirical risk measure to the risk measure
obtained by the Monte Carlo simulation from the model to see the impact of model risk.
However, we cannot judge whether the diﬀerence is due to model misspeciﬁcation or
estimation risk since the precisions of the estimates of the risk measure obtained by the
Monte Carlo simulation and the empirical risk measure are not (necessarily) equal. To
analyze the part of the model risk due to model misspeciﬁcation and estimation risk,
we perform an auxiliary computation. We generate an auxiliary data set of returns
{h∗
1,...,h∗
n} and prices {s∗
0,...,s∗
n} according to the model assumptions of equal length to











.9 On this auxiliary data we perform the same
analysis as on {s0,...,sn} and {h1,...,hn}. The diﬀerence between the empirical data
and the model data lies therefore in the fact that we removed the dependence structure
from {h1,...,hn} and that all moments in the auxiliary data set are determined by the
ﬁrst two.
C. Set-up of experiment
We investigate two major markets on which ﬁnancial options are actively traded: The
Standard and Poor’s 500 (SPX) for equity options and the British pound / U.S. dollar
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30(£/$) foreign exchange (FX) rate. Sample periods vary depending on data availability.
The data was obtained from Datastream (deﬁnitions and sources of the data can be
found in Appendix B). The models that we investigate all come from the Black-Scholes
(BS) framework. Though its deﬁciencies have been demonstrated numerous times, it
remains the most widely used option pricing model.
The original BS model (see Black and Scholes (1973)) was designed for European op-
tions on non-dividend paying stock. Since the SPX consists of dividend paying stocks, we
use the adjusted BS model by Merton (1973) which allows for a continuous proportional
dividend yield δ. Since future dividends are unknown, this represents another source of
risk in trading derivatives, namely dividend risk. We compute the option prices using
the realized dividend yield.10 For FX options we use the Garman-Kohlhagen model
(see Garman and Kohlhagen (1983)) which adjusts the original BS model for options on
foreign currencies. For the pricing formulas we refer to the original papers, Green and
Figlewski (1999), or Hull (2000).
To compare risks of derivatives with diﬀerent characteristics (call/put ﬂag, money-
ness, and time to maturity) we always write enough contracts to generate a premium
(initial value) of $100. The results can then be interpreted as a dollar return on an
investment of $100 in the speciﬁed contract or percentage returns per dollar of option
premium. To limit derivatives risk one can essentially distinguish three strategies. The
ﬁrst strategy is to diversify using derivatives with diﬀerent characteristics and other
risky assets. The second approach is using cash ﬂow matching which consists of creat-
ing oﬀsetting positions with diﬀerent counterparties such that the derivatives contract
is replicated. Though cash ﬂow matching is the most precise method of hedging and,
furthermore, model independent, it is rarely possible for a ﬁnancial institution to con-
struct a cash ﬂow matching hedge. In general, the public wants to be long in options
which brings about the short options position of the ﬁnancial industry and, thereby,
making it impossible for the ﬁnancial institution to match all of its cash ﬂows. Finally,
10We also did the analysis using the expected dividend yields from Datastream (for the deﬁnitions
and computations, see Appendix C) which resulted only in minor changes. Furthermore, we performed
the analysis on the S&P500 total return index as if the S&P 500 was a non-dividend paying index. This
also resulted in minor changes.
31the ﬁnancial institution can hedge using delta hedging11 to hedge the derivatives risk.
Since cash ﬂow matching is impractical and Green and Figlewski (1999) showed that
delta hedging is far superior to hedging by diversiﬁcation, we restrict ourselves to delta
hedging which is also the most often used hedge strategy in the ﬁnancial industry.
ITM options end in the money much more than OTM options. This could result
in diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness of the hedge strategy. To investigate the inﬂuence of
moneyness we compare the results for ITM, ATM, and OTM options where we take
OTM options with a strike of 0.4 standard deviations below or above (ITM or OTM)
the mean.12 This more or less covers the range of options seen in the market.
D. Results
In this section we discuss the results from the experiment described above. Figure 6
shows the nonparametric estimates of the densities of the P&L for a one year at-the-
money13 (ATM) call option, put option, and straddle on the S&P 500. We see that the
diﬀerences are small. Since traders prefer to trade straddles (volatility trading) rather
than single calls or puts (taking a market view) from now on. We see that the density
estimates under the model assumptions are more or less symmetric, while the empirical
density estimates are skewed to the left. Therefore, it happens much more often than
expected that the actual cost of hedging exceeds the option premium by a substantial
amount. To measure the risk it is therefore wise to consider risk measures taking the
tail into account such as the VaR and TCE.
In Table III we present the mean return, 99% VaR, 95% VaR, 95% TCE, and 90%
TCE of a portfolio of straddles with an initial value of $100 on the real data. We
see that on average this premium of $100 is about the amount needed to hedge the
derivative. Except for the 2 year £/$ exchange rate none of the mean returns diﬀers
statistically signiﬁcantly from zero. Due to the overlapping samples that arise if we write
11Traders also often hedge other greeks (gamma, vega, etc.). As argued by Green and Figlewski (1999)
this requires, however, other options which need to be bought from other ﬁnancial institutions. The
overall ﬁnancial industry is therefore restricted to delta hedging.








− (T) the OTM strike with
maturity date T and k
+ (T) the ITM strike with maturity date T.
13Moneyness is deﬁned as m =l o g ( F/k)w h e r eF denotes the futures price and k the strike price.














Figure 6. Plot of nonparametric estimates of the density of the cost of hedging of a
1 year ATM option on the S&P 500. The cost of hedging for the Black-Scholes model
(normal), a worst-case Black-Scholes model, and the empirical cost of hedging is plotted.
In the upper panel a call is plotted, in the middle panel a put, and in the lower panel a
straddle.


















Figure 7. Time series of the cost of hedging over time for call, put, and straddle in the
upper, middle, and lower panel, respectively.
a new option contract every day, we need to correct the standard errors. For example,
in Figure 7 we see that the costs of hedging are highly positively correlated over time.
This correlation can be taken into account by using the Newey and West (1987) standard
errors with a period length equal to the time to maturity minus one day.14 The diﬀerence
between regular standard errors and Newey and West (1987) standard errors is found to
be quite substantial. Due to the dependence of our model risk measure on a worst case
market risk measure, this diﬀerence is important for the calculation of the model risk
and should be taken into account.15 Consider, for example, the 5% VaR of the P&L for
the straddle in the upper panel with a maturity of 1 year. The estimated total risk is
given by 86.4+1 .96 ∗ 47.2 = 178.9 whereas it would have been 86.4+1 .96 ∗ 4.2=9 4 .6
with the use of regular standard errors which is an underestimation of the total risk of
14After the time to maturity minus one day the theoretical autocorrelation is zero. However, often
it is recommended to take some more lags into account since the longer lags are quite substantially
downweighted in the Newey-West standard errors. We included some extra lags and found more or less
the same results and therefore choose to restrict to taking time to maturity minus one day.
15This was not done in Green and Figlewski (1999) and leads to underestimation of the model risk.
3453%. In the second panel of Table III we use the data from 01-01-’88 to 26-10-’01 to
investigate the impact of the crash of 1987 on our results. We see that the VaRs and
TCEs decrease dramatically for the 1 and 2 year maturity. The reason that the results
for the one and three months options are more or less the same (the standard errors are
obviously bigger due to fewer data) is that less observations were inﬂuenced by the crash
due to their shorter time to maturity. Comparing the results including and excluding
the crash, we notice that, if we include the crash, the option positions seem riskier the
longer the time to maturity. Excluding the crash produces the opposite result, that is,
the longer maturity positions seem less risky. In case of the £/$ exchange rate there
does not seem to be a clear dependence on time to maturity.
Tables IVand Vpresent a decomposition of the total risk consisting of the market
risk computed according to the model and the model risk which itself can be decom-
posed into estimation risk and misspeciﬁcation risk. For example, if we take the 1 year
ATM straddle on the S&P 500 (using the ’88-’01 sample) we ﬁnd that of the total risk
according to the 5% TCE of $89.6 consists for 49% ($44.1) of market risk due to discrete
hedging. This risk could be estimated by using the model. The estimation risk is 16%
($13.9) which could also be found by using the model and calculating the appropriate
standard errors. The misspeciﬁcation risk is substantial and amounts to 35% ($31.6).
It is clear that the model risk due to misspeciﬁcation risk prevails over the estimation
risk. Furthermore, we see that the model estimates the market risk induced by discrete
hedging at a much too low level.
In Tables VI and VII we study the eﬀect of the moneyness on the performance of the
model. Since straddles consist of a call and a put with the same strike, we give separate
results for calls and puts. For the deﬁnition of the moneyness, we took the moneyness of
the call option of the straddle. We ﬁrst see for OTM options that call and put options,
separately are much riskier than a straddle consisting of an OTM call and an ITM put.
Therefore, the risk of writing an OTM call (or put, see results for ITM straddle) can be
substantially decreased by adding a put (or call) to the portfolio. For the ATM and ITM
options the results are more or less the same for calls, puts, and straddles. Comparing
35Table III: Return, VaR, and TCE of the P&L of writing options
The upper panel of the table reports the performance of the delta hedge strategy for ATM straddles using a historical
volatility estimator based on 1 year data. Between brackets both the Newey-West standard errors correcting for overlapping
samples (on the left) and regular standard errors (on the right) are reported.
Underlying Maturity Mean Return 1% VaR 5% VaR 5% TCE 10% TCE
Percentage calls
In-the-money


















































































































































Decomposition of Model Risk for 1% VaR
In this table the total risk measured by the 1% VaR of a straddle is split into three
components: The market risk due to discrete hedging (according to the model), the
estimation risk involved in determining this market risk, and the misspeciﬁcation risk.
For every maturity the ﬁrst row reports the cumulative absolute total risk, while in the
























































Decomposition of Model Risk for 5% TCE
In this table the total risk measured by the 5% TCE of a straddle is split into three
components: The market risk due to discrete hedging (according to the model), the
estimation risk involved in determining this market risk, and the misspeciﬁcation risk.
For every maturity the ﬁrst row reports the cumulative absolute total risk, while in the























































38Table VI: 1% VaR for diﬀerent types and moneyness
This table reports the market risk (according to the model), estimation risk, and misspeciﬁcation risk for OTM, ATM, ITM
calls, puts, and straddles measured by the 1% VaR. The ﬁrst row gives the percentage of options that ended in the money.
In the second row the cumulative absolute total risk in dollar returns on a $100 investment in the option is shown. The third





































































































9Table VII: 5% TCE for diﬀerent types and moneyness
This table reports the market risk (according to the model), estimation risk, and misspeciﬁcation risk for OTM, ATM, ITM
calls, puts, and straddles measured by the 5% TCE. The ﬁrst row gives the percentage of options that ended in the money.
In the second row the cumulative absolute total risk in dollar returns on a $100 investment in the option is shown. The third





































































































0the riskiness of the options with diﬀerent levels of moneyness, we notice that the OTM
options are riskier than the ITM options. The risk of the ATM options lies in between.
Another interesting feature is that for OTM options the misspeciﬁcation risk is more
important than for ITM options. This indicates that ITM options are more easy to
hedge. Once an option is clearly ITM, the delta is close to one and it does not make
much diﬀerence whether the underlying data is more skewed or fat-tailed.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a framework to set capital requirements for trading
activities in a market based on the extent to which this market can be reliably modeled.
Our framework extends the (market) risk framework set out by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber,
and Heath (1999) and Delbaen (2000) by considering risk measurement methods for a
class of models instead of a risk measure for one particular model. This allows for a
quantiﬁcation of model risk on top of market risk measurement.
The general framework presented is elaborated in such a manner that it ﬁts well
in the capital adequacy framework set out by the Basle Committee and that of many
internal risk management divisions. The use of risk measurement methods extends
the currently used value-at-risk and the recently proposed coherent risk measures in a
natural way.
We decompose the total model risk into a component due to estimation error and a
component due to misspeciﬁcation. This is established using a tolerance set restricted
to a model class in order to quantify estimation risk and an unrestricted tolerance set to
quantify misspeciﬁcation risk. This allows a division of capital requirements currently
used (for example, the multiplication factor of the BIS) in market risk, model risk
(estimation risk and misspeciﬁcation risk), and residual risks.
Our results suggest that, for commonly used models, misspeciﬁcation risk dominates
estimation risk. The analysis indicates that the multiplication factor set by the BIS is
conservative if it would only be intended to cover model risk. We ﬁnd, based on the
standard 95%, and 99% conﬁdence intervals, that a multiplication factor of about 2,
41and 2.3, respectively would suﬃce for a 99% value at risk, while a multiplication factor
of about 1.7 and 4, respectively would suﬃce for a 95% tail conditional expectation in
case of the S&P 500. For the £ / $ exchange rate we ﬁnd multiplication factors of about
1.6 (95% level) and 1.5 (95% level), respectively. In general the conﬁdence levels chosen
by the BIS or any other regulator need to address the trade-oﬀ between limiting the
probability of excessive losses on the one hand and leaving room for operation in the
market on the other hand. Besides model risk the multiplication factor set by the BIS
should also cover hard-to-measure risks such as operational risk, legal risk, etc. Our
framework helps disentangling the capital requirements set by the BIS into market risk,
model risk, and residual risks.
Applying our methodology to hedged derivative securities we ﬁnd that hedged deriva-
tive securities are much riskier than stock portfolios. For ATM straddles the capital
reserve based on a 1% value at risk is about the size of the position. Splitting the model
risk into estimation risk and misspeciﬁcation risk, we ﬁnd that the misspeciﬁcation risk
dominates. Investigating OTM, ATM, and ITM options we see that the Black-Scholes
model performs well in modeling ITM options (which are in general easy to model). For
the much harder to model OTM options we see that the misspeciﬁcation risk is often
above 50%.
Concluding, the framework presented allows regulators to diﬀerentiate their capital
requirements on the basis of the extent to which a market can be reliably modeled on the
basis of state-of-the-art technology. Depending on the performance of the model used for
market risk assessment by the individual bank, model risk reserves can be determined.
A further comparison between markets on the basis of the extent to which they can be
reliably modeled and the determination of the size of model risk reserves for diﬀerent
models is left for future empirical research.
42A. Risk measure derivations
A. Computation of TCE
To compute the TCE under normality we use some well-known properties of the normal
and lognormal distribution. We can compute the tail conditional expectation of X when



































































































































Φ(zp − σ) (23)
where zp (µ,σ ) denotes the p-quantile of the N
 
µ,σ 2 
distribution and is given by
zp (µ,σ )=zpσ+µ,w h e r ezp denotes the p-quantile of the standard normal distribution.
B. Asymptotic distribution of VaR and TCE
We derive the asymptotic distribution of the VaR and the TCE starting with the para-
metric case.
16L(X) denotes the law of X and N refers to the normal distribution.
43B.1. Parametric case


















for j =1 ,..,n. µ denotes the yearly mean, σ2 the yearly variance,














































i − ˆ µT
 2
,
the maximum likelihood estimators for µ and σ2, respectively.
Since the VaR and TCE are functions of µ and σ, their asymptotic distribution can
be computed by applying the delta method (see, for example, Van der Vaart (1998)) to
(24). We start with VaR. Let θ =( µ,σ )a n dX0 is the initial capital. All computations
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, τ = nT. The empirical














n(Fn (y) − F (y))
d →N(0,F(y)(1− F (y))) (38)
To compute the asymptotic distributions of the VaR and the TCE we need to com-
pute the inﬂuence functions18 of the VaR and the TCE. The value-at-risk19 is given
by
ΨVaR (F) ≡ VaRmn (Πmn)
= F−1 (p), (39)
and its inﬂuence function by
ψVaR (F)=




















Based on the asymptotic distribution given in (41) we can construct a conﬁdence interval




|t=0ψ ((1 − t)F + tδx),
where δx denotes the Dirac measure.
19The quantile function of CDF F is the generalized inverse F
−1 :( 0 ,1) → IR given by
F
−1 (α)=i n f{x : F (x) ≥ α}
48for F−1 (p), namely
CI1−α (VaRmn (Πmn)) =
 






where zα denotes the α-quantile of the standard normal distribution. The density f in












The worst-case VaR is given by
Ψwc
VaR (F)=Va R wc
mn (Πmn)


















































VaRmn =I E ψwc2
VaR (F).
49The Tail conditional expectation is given by
ΨTCE (F) = TCEmn (Πmn)
=I E F
 
Y |Y ≤ F−1 (p)
 
, (47)







y − F−1 (p)
 






y − F−1 (p)
 
I I(−∞,F −1(p)] (y) − ΨTCE (F) − F−1 (p). (48)
The asymptotic variance of   TCEmn (Πmn)=I E Fn
 
Y |Y ≤ F−1 (p)
 
is given by
























The asymptotic distribution of   TCEmn (Πmn)=I E Fn
 
Y |Y ≤ F−1 (p)
 











A conﬁdence interval for TCEmn (Πmn)=I E
 
Y |Y ≤ F−1 (p)
 
can be constructed using
(49), namely
CI1−α (TCEmn (Πmn)) =
 







The worst case tail conditional expectation is given by
Ψwc
TCE (F) = TCEwc
mn (Πmn)





50and its inﬂuence function is given by
ψwc
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The asymptotic distribution of   TCE
wc

















TCEmn =I E ψwc2
TCE (F).
B. Model risk for popular risk measures
In this appendix we illustrate the model risk measure for coherent risk measures and,
in particular, the worst conditional expectation and SPAN.
A coherent risk measure method ρm for model m =( Ω ,F,P) can be written in the
form20
ρm (Π) = supQ∈P(m) IE Q [Π].
Diﬀerent choices of P (m) produce diﬀerent risk measures. We specify P (m)f o rW C E
and SPAN.
Example 3 (WCE) Given is a model m with a base probability P, m =( Ω ,F,P). The
20For simplicity we use the deﬁnition given by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999). The
deﬁnition for general probability spaces is given in Delbaen (2000).
51class of models P (m)i sg i v e nb y
PWCE (m)={P(.|A)|P(A) >α }.
Example 4 (SPAN) Given is a model m with a base probability P, m =( Ω ,F,P), with





The SPAN method is such that 21
PSPAN (m) ⊂{ Q|Q << P}.
Note the diﬀerence between P (m)a n dK in Def. 11. P (m) is a set of probability
measures based on one base probability measure P to compute a coherent market risk
measure. However, K denotes a set of models. The models in this set can have diﬀerent
measurable spaces and diﬀerent base probability measures. The model risk measure for
a general coherent risk measure is then given by
φRMM(Π,m,K)=s u p k∈K supQ∈P(k) IE Q [Π] − supQ∈P(m) IE Q [Π].
C. Data
This appendix describes the data used in the study. In Section IVwe use the total
return series from DATASTREAM code: S&PCOMP(RI). In Section Vwe use the
original S&P 500 series code: S&PCOMP. The realized dividend yield is constructed
as the diﬀerence in returns of S&PCOMP(RI) and S&PCOMP. The expected dividend
yield is the series given by DATASTREAM code: S&PCOMP(DY). The £/$ exchange
rates is given by DATASTREAM code: USBRITP(ER). For the US risk free interest
rate we have transformed the DATASTREAM series ECUSD3M(IR) to continuously
21Of course, any probability measure P
∗ equivalent to P could serve as a base probability measure for
PSPAN. (See SPAN (1995) for details or Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999) for a summary).
52compounded interest rates. For the UK risk free interest rates we use the continuously
compounded interest rates of the DATASTREAM series ECUKP3M(IR).
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